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The proliferation of Free Trade Areas (FTAs) in the last decade has begun
to generate interest in one of its most important components: rules of origin
or RoO for short. These specify the conditions under which a good becomes
eligible for zero tariﬀsi na nFTA. While it is tempting to think of FTAs
as liberalizing, they are often not. The main reason is that RoO are in
themselves hidden protection: they create what look like tariﬀs on imported
intermediate inputs and aﬀect the price of domestically made inputs as well.
These RoO are negotiated industry by industry and there is enormous scope
for well organized industries to essentially insulate themselves from the eﬀects
of the FTAby devising suitable RoO. In this manner, RoO may even make
FTAs feasible in the presence of organized interest groups. Grossman and
Helpman (1995) for example argue that being able to exclude certain sectors
(which is what appropriately constructed RoO will do) can make a FTA
viable.1
This paper surveys the existing theoretical literature with a view to ex-
plaining in a non technical manner what RoO do and why they are critical
in determining the eﬀects of FTAs. This is an area that has been neglected
in economics2 until quite recently, witness the absence of RoO in most books
1A recent paper that develops this idea is Duttagupta and Panagariya (2001) who
argue that RoO can improve the political viability of FTAs.T h e y d o s o i n a m e n u
auction framework a la Grossman and Helpman (1995), (2001).
2Though not neglected in law, see for example Vermulst (1992).
1dealing with integration even as late as the book by de Melo and Panagariya
(1993). Consequently, much of the work being surveyed here is quite recent.
Many analysts have tended to view NAFTA and other FTA arrange-
ments as being similar to customs unions. Indeed, in some respects they
are. However, RoO, which are part of both FTAsand customs union agree-
ments, play very diﬀerent roles under these two arrangements. In a customs
union, members have a common external tariﬀ so that there are no rents to
be obtained from trans-shipment. Therefore, when a RoO is agreed upon,
its purpose is simply to determine the extent of preferential treatment for
fellow members. For example, the European Community has rules governing
treatment of imports of semiconductors. In February 1989 the EU changed
its practice of conferring origin based on the place of assembly. It began con-
ferring origin based on the place of diﬀusion. Thus, if diﬀusion is undertaken
within the Community, then origin is granted and importation to another
EC country is duty-free. If, however, diﬀusion is undertaken abroad, then
the chip is treated as having been produced outside the community, and the
(common) external tariﬀ applies. This change would promote investment in
the EU by Japanese and U.S. ﬁrms who might otherwise have only assembly
operations in the EU and would grant origin to EC producers who assembled
their products abroad.
In an FTA, members maintain their own external tariﬀs. Hence, tar-
iﬀsm a yd i ﬀer between member countries. In this setting, RoO assume a
2function additional to that under customs unions: RoO prevent the import
of any particular commodity from entering through the country (which gets
the tariﬀ revenue) with the lowest duty on the item in question and being
re-exported to other countries in the FTA. Without RoO,aFTAcould be
highly liberalizing as the lowest tariﬀ would apply to each category of im-
ports.3 Note that such re-exports need not be a good thing. If transport costs
are signiﬁcant, such deﬂection also has real costs since trans-shipping wastes
resources. RoO might prevent or reduce such waste, thereby raising welfare.4
For example, if the trans-shipping costs are slightly below the tariﬀ diﬀeren-
tial, welfare reducing deﬂection occurs in the absence of RoO since consumer
prices are essentially unchanged, resources are used in trans-shipment, while
tariﬀ revenue falls. Rules of origin would prevent this.
Such deﬂection could lead to a tariﬀ war as countries attempt to attract
such trade. In the absence of transport costs, the country in the FTA with
the lowest tariﬀ on a product will be the conduit for all imports into the
FTA a n dw i l lr e a pa l lt a r i ﬀ revenues. This makes it in the interest of all
other countries to reduce their own tariﬀs in order to attract imports to their
ports! Only when the lowest tariﬀ is zero is this not an issue, suggesting that
in equilibrium, all external tariﬀs would be competed down to zero5!I t i s
3The liklihood of such trade deﬂection for ﬁnal goods was pointed out in Shibata (1967).
4In addition, standard second best arguments also apply: with many tariﬀs, reducing
one need not raise welfare.
5Richardson (1995) points out that this can happen even when there are ROO which
domestic production automatically meets. As a result, domestic production is exported
to the partner country and domestic consumption is imported.
3interesting to note that this seems to have actually happened in America after
the colonies obtained independence from the British. During the Articles of
Confederation period (1777-1789) the thirteen original states in America set
their external tariﬀs independently though internal trade was essentially free.
They were also Britain’s largest export market. Despite this, they could not
extract rents through tariﬀs or use the threat of tariﬀs to promote their
own external objectives. Since British merchants landed their goods in the
ports of the states oﬀering the most favorable terms, despite independence,
these states undercut one another in setting their duties resulting in very
open markets. This is pointed out in McGillivray and Green (2001) and was
originally mentioned in Viner (1950).
RoO can also provide an incentive for regional producers to buy interme-
diate goods from regional sources, even if their prices are higher than those
of the identical import from outside the FTA, in order to make their product
“originate" in the FTAand qualify for preferential treatment. This, in eﬀect,
protects FTA suppliers.6 As a result, an FTA can profoundly aﬀect trade
patterns and the investment ﬂows needed to sustain them. Lloyd (1993)
makes the case that using a tariﬀ on value added outsde the FTAwould be
more eﬃcient than using RoO.
6Krueger (1993) points out the protective eﬀect of RoO on domestic intermediates.
Lloyd (1993) sketches out, and Rodriguez (2001) develops more formally, a model with
multistage protection in the presence of such RoO. Also see Rosellon (2000), which was
part of his Ph.D in 1994, and Falvey and Reed (1998).
4Just because RoO m a yb ep r o t e c t i o n i s td o e sn o tp r o v et h a tt h e ya r e !
However, RoO often account for large chunks of draft agreements (RoO took
up 200 pages of the NAFTA agreement) and can be very contentious, sug-
gesting that they might be strategically used. Recent work by Estevadeordal
(2000) casts some light on this matter. He constructs a model with two
endogenous variables: the severity of the RoO and the length of the phase
in period. Both were key factors over which negotiations were conducted.
Assume that the severity of RoO is determined by exogenous factors like the
diﬀerence in the (MFN)t a r i ﬀs between the countries as well as the extent
of intra FTAtrade, but does not depend on the length of the phase in. Also,
that the length of time in the phase in period depends on the negotiated
RoO, as well as other exogenous factors. Estevadeordal (2000) estimates
such a model and argues that RoO are being used to prevent trade deﬂection
as the sectors which have large diﬀerences in tariﬀs between the partners are
the ones where RoO are strongest. Moreover, that protection and the extent
of RoO are positively correlated. Sectors with long phase in periods are also
the sectors with high predicted RoO suggesting that the same forces drive
both. The work of Cadot et. al (2002) also suggests that RoO are negating
the eﬀects of tariﬀ reductions due to an FTA. They use the severity of the
RoO index (as constructed in Estevadeordal (2000)) and a measure of tariﬀ
preferences in NAFTA as explanatory variables to explain Mexican exports
to the U.S.. They show that the former reduced Mexican exports, while the
5latter raised them, so that the net eﬀect was close to zero.
In addition, it is worth pointing out that RoO are often quite expensive
to document. As a result, even if a product satisﬁes origin, an importer may
prefer to pay the tariﬀ rather than bother with the documentation needed.
Some idea of how extensive this is might be gleaned from the prevalence of
outward processing trade (OPT) between the EU and the Central and East-
e r nE u r o p e a nc o u n t r i e s 7. The latter have duty free access to the EU but
instead of proving origin is met, EU ﬁr m su s et h eO P Tp r o v i s i o ni n s t e a d
suggesting that the cost of proving origin exceeds the duty paid using the
OPT provision. For example, as documented in Breton and Manchin (2002),
when Albanian exports of clothing to the EU are considered, OPT provisions
were used over 90% of the time. However, Turkey, which is part of the cus-
toms union (hence it does not have any ROO to meet) used these provisions
only .5% of the time8. Herin (1986) also shows that the cost of proving origin
seems to have led over a quarter of EFTA exports to pay the MFN tariﬀ.
Iw i l la r g u et h a tm u c ho fw h a tw eh a v el e a r n tf r o mt h el i t e r a t u r ec a nb e
summarized in three laws which are worth remembering when dealing with
RoO.
Law 1: RoO can insulate an industry from the consequences of an FTA
7OPT encourages processing overseas by EU ﬁrms as the duty that would have been
paid on the exported inputs to be processed abroad is deducted from the duty owed on
the imported product.
8It may also be that OPT trade allows a greater fraction of potential rent to be captured
by the EU importer, an open question on the empirical side.
6and it can provide hidden protection for intermediate inputs used by it. It
may well be that the ability to insulate an industry makes FTAs easier to
pass than Customs Unions. Agents who stand to lose from an FTA can
undo its eﬀects without, for the most part, even being seen as doing so! For
example, in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area (FTA), the production of aged
cheese from fresh milk does not confer origin.9 This in eﬀect prevents free
trade of cheese in the FTA.
Law 2: The precise form of the RoO matters. Lawyers and trade nego-
tiators have clearly understood this for a long time. This is evident in the
importance placed on the details of the RoO negotiated. For example, a lot
of importance was placed on the treatment of interest costs by Honda when
content requirements were being deﬁned for the FTAbetween the U.S. and
Canada.
Law 3: The time period matters. Responses to RoO take time. Short
run partial equilibrium eﬀects can diﬀer greatly from long run, general equi-
librium ones. For example, in the short run the response to RoO may be
primarily in terms of trade ﬂows while in the long run it may take the form
of investment ﬂows. Hence, it is vital to specify the time frame for analysis
and to incorporate the major linkages across sectors and options available to
ﬁrms.
Law 4: You can have too much of a good thing. Having more restrictive
9See Palmeter 1993 footnote 4 for details.
7RoO may result in higher not lower imports! This point is quite subtle and
provides a warning to policy makers and potential users that RoO may well
backﬁre!
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 looks at how RoO are deﬁned.
Section 3 examines how they aﬀect the sourcing of inputs and hence the level
of costs. Section 4 surveys what the literature has to say about their eﬀects
using a partial equilibrium setting. The additional complications that arise
from allowing some input prices to be endogenous are outlined as well. Sec-
tion 5 discusses extensions to general equilibrium, while Section 6 concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d
RoO can be deﬁned in a variety of diﬀerent ways. From a legal point of view,
there appear to be four criteria used singly and in combination with each
other10. These are (a) requirements in terms of domestic content: content
can be deﬁned in terms of value added or in physical terms.11 In addition,
the required share of value added can be deﬁned in terms of cost or price.
(b) Requirements in terms of a change in tariﬀ heading: RoO set in terms
of a change in tariﬀ heading are speciﬁed in terms of tariﬀ categories. To
satisfy origin requirements a product must change its tariﬀ heading in a spec-
10For example, the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship (CER) relies
on a 50% value added standard in conjunction with the requirement that the last process
performed in manufacture be in the territory of the exporting member state.
11One example of physical content requirements is that in the cigarette industry in
Australia. Cigarette manufacturers must meet a domestic content requirement on tobacco
leaf use, deﬁned by weight.
8iﬁed way. By making the changes needed more or less extensive, the origin
requirement can be made more or less restrictive. In addition, exceptions
can be explicitly made. For example, under NAFTA, transformation from
any other chapter (2 digit classiﬁcation level) of the harmonized system, to
tomato catsup, chapter 21, confers origin, except transformation from tomato
paste which falls in chapter 20! Since the U.S. is a larger market for catsup
than Mexico, while Mexico has a natural advantage in growing tomatoes, and
hence making paste, this seems like a clear attempt to keep the production
of catsup in the U.S..
( c )R e q u i r e m e n t si nt e r m so fs p e c i ﬁed processes that must be performed
within the FTA or CU: In the case of American imports of apparel under
NAFTA, the rule is one of “triple transformation.” Only if each step of
the transformation from raw material to ﬁnished garment has been under-
t a k e nw i t h i nt h eFTAwill preferential treatment be given. American textile
producers, of course, beneﬁtf r o mt h i sr u l e .
(d) Requirements that the product has been “substantially transformed”.
This is usually hard to pin down as it is loosely deﬁned. In the United States
the term “substantial transformation” has come to mean the determination
of origin based on common law, reasoning from case to case. It then results
in commodity-speciﬁc RoO which fall into one of the earlier three categories.
93 RoO and Costs
From an analytical viewp oint the basic eﬀect ofRoO i s to raise the pro duc-
tion costs of the product which meets the binding RoO. In the discussion that
follows I draw from Krishna and Krueger (1995). RoO specify constraints
that must be met in order to obtain origin. If these constraints are binding
then the choice of inputs used in production diﬀers from the unconstrained
ones and hence costs are higher if the RoO are met. Since more restric-
tive RoO constrain choices more than do less restrictive one, an increase in
restrictiveness raises the minimized level of costs.
This is illustrated in Figure 1 which illustrates a physical content require-
ment that has to be met to obtain origin. FTA inputs (L) and imported
inputs (K) are used to make the good in question under constant returns to
scale. The unit iso-quant is depicted by the curve in Figure 1. At existing
prices for L and K, ﬁrms choose the input mix at the point labeled Z using
L and K so that their ratio equals α0. The lowest unit costs attainable are
represented by the height of the line AB. A binding RoO would remove Z
from the feasible set. If, for example, the RoO required L/K to be at least
α>α 0, then only points below the ray from the origin with slope 1/α and
above the iso-quant would be feasible. As a result, unit costs are minimized
by choosing the input mix at X. Unit costs if the RoO are met are given by
the height of the line DE. Note that the RoO distort the input mix in favor
of the FTAmade input L for any given level of output so that at any given



































































K = α>α 0
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K
11output level, the demand for L is higher.
It is easy to see that as the RoO become more restrictive, that is, as α
rises and the ray from the origin swing down, unit costs rise. Suppressing
input prices in the notation for the time being, let unit costs when the RoO
is met be R(α).N o t et h a tR(α) is increasing in α for α>α 0.
4T h e E ﬀects of RoO: Partial Equilibrium
The literature has by and large assumed perfect competition. The partial
equilibrium setting provides three results. First, that in the long run, RoO
cause large changes in investment ﬂows due to an FTA. In the absence of
RoO, there would be large changes in trade ﬂows, not investment ﬂows.
Second, in the long run, RoO may raise or lower welfare relative to pre FTA
levels depending on their restrictiveness. If RoO are weak, they are likely
to raise them12, while if they are stringent, they will reduce them. Third,
that in short run, where capacity constraints exist, the form of the RoO
is especially important. It is easiest to explain these three results with a
particular example based on Krishna and Krueger (1995).
Suppose that the FTA is made up of country A and B.B o t hc o u n t r i e s
import the ﬁnal good in question from the rest of the world and take the world
price of P∗ as given. B also produces it domestically so that the domestic
price in B equals the domestic unit cost of production, which equals the world
12I say likely since in a world with multiple distortions or tariﬀs, a reduction in some of
them may not raise welfare as indicated by the theorem of the second best.
12p r i c ea sw ea s s u m et h a tt h et a r i ﬀ in B is zero. Country A has a positive
tariﬀ on the good, and for simplicity assume A has no domestic production.
All tariﬀs are constant across suppliers13, though members of an FTA get
preferential treatment.
An FTA member ﬁrm interested in selling its products in the partner
country has the choice of meeting the RoO and having zero tariﬀsl e v i e do n
it, but having higher costs of production (as well as further documentation
c o s t st h a tt h eRoO has been met14) and not meeting it and paying the tariﬀ.
I tc h o o s e st h eo p t i o nt h a th a sah i g h e rp a y o ﬀ.N o ws i n c eB imports the good
and has the lower tariﬀ, ﬁrms in A w i l ln o tw a n tt os e l lt oB but ﬁrms in B
would be interested in selling to A. Thus the price in B is the world price, and
must be no weakly lower than the price in A. Let PA and PB(= P∗ = CB)
denote domestic prices in A and B.
A ﬁrm in B exporting to A could meet the RoO and obtain PA−RB(α),
or ignore it and get PA − CB(1 + tA) where CB and RB(α) denote the
unrestricted and restricted unit costs in B15. Hence, if RB(α) <C B(1+tA),
it is worthwhile for it to accept the restriction and otherwise it is not. The
price in A is therefore the minimum of RB(α) and CB(1 + tA). Recall that
13This makes sense given that most countries extend most favored nation treatment to
all their trading partners.
14Providing appropriate documentation to demonstrate origin can be very costly. Herin
(1986) reports costs to Finnish ﬁrms of satisfying EC ROOs for entry of Finnish exports
costs ﬁrms satisfying ROOs from 1.4 to 5.7 percent of the value of shipment (Herin, pg.
7). Such costs are reported to have resulted in a quarter of eligible EFTA exports to the
EU paying the applied MFN duty rather than providing the needed documentation.
15Assume that tariﬀs are levied on price which equals domestic cost.
13restricted costs increase in α and equal unrestricted costs for low enough
levels of α. If RoO are not restrictive, i.e. α is below α0, in Figure 2 (which
depicts both demand in A and costs as a function of α)t h e nRoO are not
binding and RB(α)=CB. In this case the creation of an FTAwill result in
the eﬀective lowering of tariﬀsi nA on the ﬁnal good to those in B.I fRoO
are restrictive but not too much so, i.e., α is between α0 and α2,t h e nc o s t s
of supplying A exceed world costs but are below the cost of imports from
outside the FTA. Thus the price in A rises with RA(α) but is still below
the pre FTA price. Once RoO are restrictive enough, i.e. α exceeds α2,
then costs of supplying A from B exceed the cost of imports from outside
the FTA.
These results are in sharp contrast to those which would prevail in the
absence of any RoO. In the absence of transport costs and under the same
assumptions as made above, all an FTAwithout RoO would do would be to
reduce tariﬀso nt h eﬁnal good as all imports to A would come in through
B to avail of the lower tariﬀ there. Welfare would have to rise in A due
to the FTA,a st h eg a i ni nc o n s u m e rs u r p l u sw o u l do u t w e i g ht h el o s si n
tariﬀ revenue. However, production in B need not be aﬀected. With RoO
production in B rises to the point where B supplies all A’s imports and this
requires large capital inﬂows into the sector. This the logic of the ﬁrst result.
Note that A’s welfare with RoO is non monotonic in α. Welfare is the
sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and tariﬀ revenue. Since there



































is competition and constant returns to scale, price equals cost and there are
no proﬁts in the long run. Welfare in A must thus increase above its pre
FTA level if α ≤ α0. This occurs as price falls so that consumer surplus
rises. Although tariﬀ revenue falls, as is usual, the consumer surplus gain
(EDFC) exceeds the tariﬀ r e v e n u el o s s( E F D G )a sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2 . I n
the region where the RoO bind, but it remains worthwhile accepting them,
that is α1 <α≤ α2, an increase in α raises the price in A as the price equals
RA(α). As α approaches α2, all consumer surplus gains vanish and since there
15are no tariﬀ revenues either, welfare must be lower that prior to the FTA.
In other words, the RoO get more restrictive, the higher production costs
eat away the consumer surplus gain of an FTA. At some point this makes
an FTAworse than no FTA.F i n a l l y ,w h e nRoO are so restrictive that they
are ignored, i.e., α exceeds α2, the FTAhas no eﬀect on the price in A and
the pre FTAw e l f a r ep r e v a i l s .T h i si st h el o g i co ft h es e c o n dr e s u l ta b o v e .
All the above is valid for the long run. However, in the short run there
are likely to be capacity constraints since it takes time for capacity to be
built. Think of these capacity constraints as taking a very strict form so that
costs are constant RB(α) until the capacity constraint where they become
inﬁnite. Thus, supply facing B when RoO are set at α consists of three
distinct segments. Supply is zero when price is below RB(α). At a price of
RB(α) a horizontal segment exists up to B’s capacity. For price above RB(α),
supply equals capacity so that there is a vertical section. As world prices are
given, if the price weakly exceeds P∗(1 + tA), supply is inﬁnite. As a result,
the price is given by the minimum of RB(α) and P∗(1 + tA) only if capacity
in B exceeds the demand at RB(α). Otherwise, there are quasi rents and the
price in A exceeds production costs.
In the short run, as opposed to the long run, all imports to A do not
come from B. In the short run, output, which equals exports to A from B,
expands to capacity at which point marginal costs rise choking oﬀ supply.
Assuming there is no change in the world price and given than B cannot meet
16all of A’s demand, the price in A will be unchanged. All that will happen
is a reallocation of A’s imports from the rest of the world to B,c a u s i n ga
reduction in A’s welfare arising from the loss in tariﬀ revenues. In the long
run, of course, assuming no changes in world prices and the price of inputs
in B, investment will ﬂow into B, leading to the long run eﬀects outlined
above.
4.1 Why Details Matter
Why should the details of how RoO are deﬁned matter to agents? Given the
eﬀort devoted to thrashing out such details it is clear that these details are
seen as being critical. The reason is simple. Even though deﬁnitions may
sound alike they need not be. Some deﬁnitions may be easier to meet than
others and lobbying for the most favorable deﬁnition is to be expected. For
example, suppose that costs have three components: capital costs, denoted
by B, FTA inputs costs denoted by A, and imported inputs costs denoted
by D. Total costs are C,a n dC = A + B + D. Suppose that RoO specify
the minimum share that FTAinputs must account for. Suppose that this is
deﬁned as a cost share. Now note that excluding capital costs from all costs
makes any given RoO harder to meet. If capital costs are included, the share
of FTA costs is given by (A + B)/C. If they are excluded, they are given
by A/(C − B).R e m o v i n gB from the numerator and denominator reduces
the numerator by a greater percentage than the denominator reducing their
ratio. As a result, any required share of domestic input used is harder to
17satisfy if capital costs are excluded.16 The basic intuition is that including
capital costs (or any other costs for that matter) raises the numerator by a
greater percentage than the denominator, thus raising their ratio, since the
numerator is by deﬁnition smaller than the denominator. This might help
explain why the treatment of interest costs was a bone of contention between
the U.S. and Canada and Honda in deﬁning content requirements.17
Another example where details matter comes from deﬁning shares in
terms of price versus cost. In Krishna and Krueger (1995) it is argued that
deﬁning content in terms of cost or price makes no diﬀerence in the long run,
basically because price equals cost in the long run. Nor would it make a
diﬀerence in the long run whether a minimum share, α, of domestic inputs
have to be used or whether imported inputs are restricted to the equivalent
maximum share, 1 − α. However, both of these matter in the short run due
to the existence of quasi rents.
For example, consider a rule of origin deﬁn e di nt e r m so ft h em i n i m u m
share of domestic inputs relative to price rather than cost. Since price exceeds
cost and an increase in the denominator makes the constraint harder to meet,
the price based scheme has a higher cost of production than the equivalent
16The argument is not quite tight since the choice of inputs will diﬀer in the two cases.
17Some work does not look at the restricitiveness of RoO. For example, Krishna and
Panagariya (2001) assume that ﬁnal goods produced in the FTA using the minimum
cost input mix automatically meet the RoO. Hence, all the production of the lower tariﬀ
country is shipped to the higher tariﬀ one. Consumer prices diﬀer but producer prices do
not so that production eﬃciency is mintained. They show that, analogous to the famous
Kem Wan result, there exists a Pareto improving FTA in this setting when lump sum
transfers are permitted.
18cost based one. With this deﬁnition, for any required share, α, ﬁrms in B
prefer the cost based form to the price based form.
Alternatively, consider a RoO deﬁned in terms of the maximum share of
foreign inputs relative to price rather than cost. Since price exceeds cost and
an increase in the denominator makes the constraint easier to meet, the price
based scheme has a lower cost of production than the equivalent cost based
one! Thus, for any required share, α, ﬁrms in B prefer the price based form
to the cost based form.
4.2 Going Part Way: Allowing Input Price Changes
T h e r ea r ea tl e a s tt w ok i n d so fp r i c ec h a n g e st h a tn e e dt ob ea l l o w e df o r :
Changes in the word prices of goods and changes in the prices of intermediate
goods in the FTA. Incorporating the former involves dropping the small
country assumption while incorporating the latter involves allowing for at
least some general equilibrium eﬀects to occur. Falvey and Reed (2000)
argue that RoO have a role complementary to that of tariﬀsa sRoO aﬀect
input demand. Thus, a large country could aﬀect the terms of trade in both
ﬁnal and intermediate goods by using RoO as well as tariﬀso nt h eﬁnal good.
Ju and Krishna (1998) and (2002a) show that allowing the price of FTA
inputs to be endogenously determined results in a number of interesting
insights. The discussion which follows can be found in more detail in their
work. The driving force behind their results is a non monotonicity that
arises naturally in such settings and which seems to have been previously
19overlooked.
An intuitive explanation of what lies at the heart of their results follows.
Suppose that there are two inputs, capital and intermediates. Suppose, more-
over, that domestic and imported are perfect substitutes and that there are
ag i v e nn u m b e ro fﬁrms who have ﬁxed capital but who can change their
use of intermediates. The RoO forces ﬁrms in the FTA who comply to use
more of the domestic intermediate that they may wish to in order to obtain
origin and hence qualify for zero tariﬀs. If the RoO is not too restrictive
then all ﬁrms will wish to comply18 and a more restrictive RoO will shift out
domestic intermediate demand making its price rise. However, there comes
a point where this price has risen to the point where ﬁrms are indiﬀerent
between complying and not.19 Some ﬁrms then choose to comply and others
and this number changes with the level of restrictiveness to change the price
of domestic intermediates so as to keep ﬁrms indiﬀerent. In this regime, in-
creases in restrictiveness have exactly opposite eﬀect on the price of domestic
intermediates!
This reversal in the comparative statics results drives their model and
yields their unusual comparative statics results. They show that as the RoO
becomes more restricitive, the price of intermediates and the import of ﬁnal
goods rises then falls while the import of intermediates ﬁrst falls and then
rises. All three have a common turning point, the point where the regime
18This is termed the homogeneous regime.
19Ju and Krishna (2002) term this the heterogenous regime.
20switches from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous one.
Much of the concern regarding preferential trading arrangements has been
with the implications of such arrangements on market access. The work of Ju
and Krishna shows that eﬀects in both ﬁnal and intermediate good market
need to be considered as they work in opposite directions. Moreover, that
it is important to look at the eﬀect on the FTA a saw h o l e ,a sw e l la so n
each member. This is because compensating ﬂows occur in other member
countries in response to changes in ﬂows in one member country.
In the model used by Ju and Krishna the intermediate good market is
the most protected (in the sense that both imports reach a minimum and
the price of FTAmade input reaches its maximum) when the regime switch
occurs. Intermediate goods producers are best oﬀ here as this is where their
product price, and hence rents, are maximized. In sharp contrast, the ﬁnal
good market is most open (in the sense that the imports reach their maxi-
m u m )a tt h es a m ep o i n t .F i n a lg o o d sp r o d u c e r si nt h el o w e rt a r i ﬀ country
gain the most when they have access to the higher tariﬀ country’s markets
a tt h el e a s tc o s t ,t h a ti st h e yw a n tt h eRoO to be non distorting. Thus these
t w og r o u p sa r el i k e l yt ol o b b yf o rd i ﬀerent levels of RoO.
5 General Equilibrium Eﬀects
Analyzing the eﬀects of RoO in general equilibrium seems like a rather hard
thing to do in an elegant manner. Krishna (2003) develops a way of looking
21at the eﬀect of conditional polices, such as RoO, in a general equilibrium
setting under perfect competition. A simple observation makes the problem
tractable using standard duality tools in general equilibrium. Polices like
RoO in an FTA have a carrot and hoop element to them. The carrot,
preferential treatment, is obtained only by jumping through hoops, namely
meeting origin requirements. The basic insight used is that if, by availing
itself of the policy, the ﬁrm can raise the factor prices it can aﬀord to pay, it
will be willing to do so. Else it will not. In other words, the paper looks at
the eﬀects of such restrictions on the factor price frontier and shows how this
can be derived quite simply for certain kinds of RoO. It is shown that when
RoO are set at ex ante binding levels, they need not be binding ex post nor
must they result in an inﬂow of capital. Moreover, the paper argues, the kind
of non monotonicity seen in Ju and Krishna (1998) is likely to be prevalent
in general equilibrium.
There has been some work on looking at the eﬀects of FTAs incorpo-
rating RoOs in a partial equilibrium framework. Such back of the envelope
calculations are not hard and can provide very interesting results. For exam-
ple, Mattoo, Roy and Subramaniam (2002) look at the eﬀects of RoO in the
Africa Growth and Opportunity Act recently enacted by the U.S. and argue
that restrictive conditions on market access, the most important of which are
the RoO, reduce its beneﬁts signiﬁcantly: they argue that the medium term
beneﬁts would have been almost ﬁve times greater without such conditions
22on access. Computable general equilibrium models can also be used to give
an idea of general equilibrium eﬀects.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Much of the concern felt about regional trading areas has been that they will
exclude non member countries from their markets. Much of this discussion,
see for example Krugman (1991) and counter arguments by Bond and Sy-
ropoulos (1996) has been couched in terms of the greater market power, and
hence higher optimal tariﬀs of larger trade blocs. However, tariﬀso nm o s t
manufactured goods are bound by concessions made in successive rounds of
negotiations under the auspices of GATT. It seems likely that RoO,w h i c h
are less well understood and extremely important in practice, provide a far
greater reason for concern.
While a beginning has been made in understanding the eﬀects of RoO at
a theoretical as well as empirical level, far more remains to be done and the
papers in this conference are making valuable contributions in this regard.
On the theoretical side, work has been conﬁned to partial equilibrium models
and has focused on perfect competition. There are many lessons that can
be learned from looking at imperfect competition and general equilibrium.
Rules of Origin clearly provide a way to raise the costs of FTA rivals. The
desirability of doing so has been studied in industrial organization. RoO can
act to segment markets. Moreover, they can result in interesting switches in
23best response functions. Many of these ideas are the subject of papers written
for this conference. However, much work remains. On the political economy
side, for example, it would be fascinating to look at particular examples in
more detail to see who lobbied for particular RoO, while using simple models
to understand their desirability for the various interest groups.
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